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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pur-
suant to Utah Code Anno. 78-2-2(3), i, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The default judgment awarded the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
by the Trial Court violated the due process clause ofthe United 
States Federal and the Utah State Constitutions in that it 
ordered demolition of property belonging to Beth Roberts Purdue 
when she had not been named as defendant in Plaintiffs-Respon-
dents' complaint. 
2. The Trial Court erred in refusing to allow Beth Purdue to 
be admitted as Defendant in a new trial on merits of the case. 
3. The Trial Court erred in denying Defendant and Appellants 
a new trial on the merits, since failure of Defendant to appear 
at a second pretrial was excusable in that he mistakenly relied 
on words and action of Plaintiffs' counsel at the first pretrial 
leading Defendant to believe the second pretrial had been waived 
by Plaintiffs. 
4. The Trial Court erred in permitting Plaintiffs' counsel 
to "correct" admitted errors in the complaint and in the default 
judgment when the errors as to parties, ownership/ addresses, 
legal description, location and building ordered demolished were 
judicial, not "clerical" (i.e., mechanical) errors in transcrib-
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ing, but involved factual and legal issues, correctable only 
through a new trial on the merits of the case itself. 
5. The Trial Court erred in sustaining the Plaintiffs' 
"corrected" default judgment which did not, in fact, "correct" 
but compounded the "errors" of the original. 
6. The Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the default and to grant the parties a new trial on the 
merits since (1) the Defendant's failure to appear was excusable; 
(2) Defendant and Appellants had a meritorious defense; (3) 
judicial errors were involved in the demolition order; and (4) 
the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction over the owner of the 
property ordered demolished. 
7. The demolition order should be vacated for reasons of 
public benefit. Defendant and Appellants' property is not dilap-
idated, dangerous or unsightly as alleged in the Plaintiffs' 
complaint. The property is, in fact, comparatively new, com-
fortable, modern, safe, attractive and eminently usable. Such 
housing is desperately needed by the community. A responsible 
humanitarian, nonprofit corporation has examined the property. 
Its officials found the buildings repairable, and have presented 
Defendant and Appellants with a bona fide offer to repair and 
manage same. This corporation will provide employment, super-
vision, on-the-job training, worthy incentives, and affordable 
housing for low-income and homeless citizens of the community who 
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have been neglected and discriminated against for too long 
already. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment: 
No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law, nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation. Killian, Constitution of the United 
States of America, p. 1212. 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . 
. deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. Killian, ibid., p. 1467. 
Utah State Constitution, Article One, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. Utah Code Anno., 
1953, p. 64. 
"Due process of law" requires that, before one can 
be bound by a judgment affecting his property rights, 
some process must be served upon which . . . is calcu-
lated to give him notice. Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76 Utah 
575 290 P950 (1930). 
Due process of law requires that notice be given to 
the person whose rights are to be affected. It hears 
before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial. Higgs v. District Court of 
Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P2d 645 (1935). 
The order of an administrative body issued without 
notice to affected individuals violates due process. 
Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 167, 321 
P2d 644 (1958). 
Utah State Constitution, Section 22 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. Utah Code Anno., 
1953, p. 119. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant and Appellants seek voidance of default order of 
demolition of property or properties in the vicinity of 500 North 
and 300 West, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Disposition in Lower Court 
Plaintiffs-Respondents obtained an ambiguous Default Judg-
ment for demolition of Appellants1 property or properties at 534 
North 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. From verdict and default 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs-Respondents, the Appellants 
now appeal. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment, revocation of the 
demolition order, and judgment in Appellants' favor as a matter 
of law, or that failing, a new trial, 
Standard of Review 
Defendant and Appellants state that the issues presented on 
appeal are as follows: 
1. Default judgment was based on Plaintiffs-Respondents' 
errors of fact, fraud in jurisdictional matters, manipulation of 
- 4 -
pretrial proceedings, misrepresentation of location of the 
property ordered demolished and the ownership thereof. The court 
erred in its refusal to hear an essential party, and in refusing 
to rehear the case on its merits despite good cause appearing. 
Appellants ask that judgment be set aside in the interest of 
justice to them and for the benefit of low-income and homeless 
persons in the community whom appellants will be unable to serve 
if this building is demolished. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs-Respondents obtained a default judgment against 
John Purdue from the Third District Court dated on or about Jan-
uary 31, 1991, ordering the demolition of a building situated on 
the property of Appellant Beth Roberts Purdue at 534 North 300 
West, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant John Purdue and Appellant 
Beth Purdue request the Utah State Supreme Court to vacate this 
order. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The property ordered demolished, 534 North 300 West, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, is not now and was not, at the time the com-
plaint was filed, owned by the party named as Defendant (John 
Purdue). It has since 1955 belonged to Beth Roberts (Purdue). 
See Addendum 2, 3, and 4. 
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2. The demolition order was obtained by default due to 
manipulation by the Plaintiffs-Respondents' attorney of pretrial 
procedures which led Defendant John Purdue to reasonably believe 
that further appearances prior to the trial would be fruitless, 
unnecessary, and had been waived by the Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
3. No legal description or correct address of the subject 
property was given in the Plaintiffs-Respondents' complaint or in 
the demolition order, just the street address of 534 North 300 
West, Salt Lake City, Utah, a property owned by Beth Purdue, who 
was not summoned or named as a party to the suit, though her name 
was surreptitiously added to the judgment and order by the Plain-
tiffs-Respondents' attorney after he had been awarded the default 
judgment and demolition order. 
4. The District Court erred in granting a demolition order 
(by default) of a property belonging to Beth Purdue, who had not 
been brought under the jurisdiction of the court. 
5. Appellants John Purdue and Beth Purdue filed a motion in 
the District Court as soon as they learned of the default judg-
ment, asking to have it set aside and requesting a trial of the 
case on its merits. The court denied this motion but ordered the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents' attorney to correct what the judge called 
"clerical errors." Appellants contend that these errors were not 
"clerical" but judgmental and thus correctable only by a new 
hearing of the case on its merits. The "corrections" made by the 
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attorney on the judge's order served only to compound the errors 
and magnify the injustice of the ruling against the appellants. 
6. The Plaintiffs-Respondents' errors pertaining to address, 
ownership of property, and the absence of a legal description of 
the property to be demolished go to the heart and essence of the 
case. These are not mere "clerical errors" but involve judg-
mental determinations. This case was never tried on its merits 
and the order should be vacated. 
7. To demolish a viable, modern, comfortable, safe, sturdy 
low-rent housing facility at this time when shortage of afford-
able housing has driven hundreds into homelessness and has raised 
rents for all tenants in the area would be wasteful, inhumane and 
against public policy. 
8. A responsible humanitarian nonprofit organization, 
"Family House, Inc.," is seeking to rehabilitate appellants' 
buildings to provide low-rent housing and to teach building and 
maintenance skills to the unemployed. A copy of their proposal 
is included in Appendix 4. This should satisfy any legitimate 
concerns of the Plaintiffs-Respondents concerning the condition 
of the property and its effect on the neighborhood. 
ARGUMENT 
(1) The Court abused discretion by failing to vacate judg-
ment ordering demolition of property belonging to Beth 
Roberts (Purdue), over whom the court had no jurisdic-
tion. 
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As soon as Defendant John Purdue learned of the default 
judgment awarded to the Plaintiffs against both John and 
Beth Purdue, the Purdues promptly filed a Notice of Objec-
tion and a motion for a hearing asking for the default to be 
vacated and to have the demolition order revoked, or for a 
trial on the merits and inclusion of Beth Purdue as defen-
dant since she had not been summoned or included in Plain-
tiffs' complaint but she claimed an interest in the property 
ordered demolished. 
At the hearing on the motion, the judge refused to 
revoke the default judgment or to hear Beth Purdue or to 
listen to John Purdue's meritorious defense. The judge 
ordered plaintiff's attorney to remove Beth Purdue's name 
from the judgment and demolition order which he thereupon 
sustained. 
Appellants contend this refusal to set aside the 
default and revoke the demolition order was an abuse of dis-
cretion in accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
(b)(1). In a Utah case in 1969 this court held: 
It is ordinarily abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for failure to appear and 
timely application is made to set it aside. Central 
Finance Company v. Kynaston, 452 P2d, 316 22, Utah 2d 
284. See also Mayhew v. Standard Gelsonite 1962, 376 
P2d 951-14, Utah 2d 5 2. 
Default judgments are not favored by the courts 
which are liberal in relieving parties of defaults 
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caused by inadvertence or excusable neglect and where 
doubt exists (ibid.). 
Utah 1962. Default judgments are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice and fair 
play. Heathman v. Falican Ind Clendenin 377 P2d 189 
14 Utah 2d. 
Utah 1974. Generally, whenever interests of justice 
and fair play will be served thereby trial court should 
exercise its discretion liberally in favor and giving 
parties an opportunity for hearing on the merits of the 
case. Barber v. Calderf 522 P2d 700. 
Utah (n.d.). Courts should exercise caution in 
regard to default judgments and should be somewhat 
indulgent in setting suth judgments aside. McKeon v. 
Mountain View Estates, Inc., 411 P2d, 129 17 Utah 2d 
323. 
Utah 1956. The default judgment should have been 
vacated in its entirety in accordance with Rule 60 of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60b(d). Kelly v. 
Scott, 298 P2d, 821 5 Utah 2d 159. 
Utah 1963. Courts will generally grant relief from 
a default judgment in doubtful cases in order that 
defaulting parties may have a hearing. Board of Educa-
tion of Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P2d 806 14 
Utah 2d 385. 
Utah (n.d.). On motion to vacate a default judgment 
discretion must be exercised in the furtherance of 
justice and the court will incline toward granting 
relief in a doubtful case so that party may have a 
hearing. Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 260 P2A, 741 13 Utah 
416. 
Utah 1955. In case of uncertainty, default judg-
ments should be set aside to allow trial on merits. 
Locke v. Peterson, 285 P2d 11113 Utah 2d 415. 
Utah 1956. Under usual circumstances it is inequit-
able and unjust to condemn a party unheard; doubts 
should be resolved in favor of setting aside default 
judgment to permit parties to have their day in court. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). Chrysler v. 
Chrysler 303 P2d 995 5 Utah 2d 415. 
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Other states have ruled similarly: 
Nevada 1961. In general, the party who has good 
defense should, when prompt application to vacate 
default judgment is made, be allowed to set it up not-
withstanding any negligence of himself or counsel. 
Blakeney v. Freemont Hotel, Inc., 360 P2d 1039 77 Nev. 
191. 
Nevada 1966. Defaulting actions of one defendant 
cannot be imputed to another who behaves properly. 
Doyle v. Jorgensen, 414 P2d 707 82 Nev 196. 
Kansas 1975. General principles cannot justify 
denying the parties their day in court except upon a 
serious showing of willful default. Vickers v. Kansas 
City, 531 P2d 113216 Kan 84. 
Arizona 1967. Default judgments are not favored. 
Ramada Inns v. Lane Bird Advertising, Inc., 426 P2d 
395, 102 Ariz. 127. 
Arizona 1967. Judgment entered by default without 
notice against party timely answering is void. 
McClintock v. Serv us Bakers, 423 P2d 722 5 Ariz. App. 
California 1957. The policy of the law is to allow 
a controversy to be tried and determined on its merits. 
Beckley v. Reclamation Board of State of California, 
312 P2d 109848c 2d 710. 
Hawaii 1962. Defendant who had filed an answer and 
thus appeared in action had right to notice of applica-
tion by plaintiff for default judgment even if defen-
dant who did not appear at preconference was in 
default. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55(b)(2). 
Stafford v. Dickison, 374 P2d 665 Haw 52. 
Oklahoma 1975. Default judgments are never viewed 
with favor. Burroughs v. Bob Martin Corp., 536 P2d 
339. 
Washington (n.d.). Grounds for vacating a default 
judgment are excusable neglect or fraud practiced by 
prevailing party. Bishop v. Illman, 126 P2d 582 14 
Wash 2d 13. 
Washington 1960. It is the policy of the law that 
controversies be settled on the merits rather than by 
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default. Dlouhy v. Dlouhy, 349 P2d 1074 55 Wash 2d 
718. 
Wyoming 1964. Judgments by default are not favored. 
Westring v. Cheyenne National Bank, 393 P2d 824, 63 Wyo 
375; Lake v. Lake, 182 P2d 824, 119 63 Wyo. 
Wyoming 1964. Purpose of rule (60b) governing vaca-
tion of default judgments is to provide courts with 
means of relieving party from oppression of final judg-
ment or order on proper showing where such judgments 
are unfairly or mistakenly entered (ibid.). 
(2) The trial court erred in ordering the plaintiff to 
amend the default judgment to correct "clerical errors" 
which were in fact judicial errors. 
These corrections as to address, location, ownership, and 
legal description of the property, proper parties to the suit, 
and the property ordered demolished go to the heart and essence 
of the case, and involve judgmental errors made by the Plain-
tiffs-Respondents in their complaint and in the default judgment 
awarded by the court. 
These are not "clerical errors" made by a typist but judg-
mental errors correctable only by a new trial of the case on its 
merits. The Plaintiffs-Respondents' so-called "corrections" only 
further compounded the confusion and injustice of the default 
judgment. 
A "clerical error" is one made by a clerk in tran-
scribing or otherwise, and, of course, must be apparent 
on the face of the record, and capable of being 
corrected by reference to the record only. Froth v. 
Birmingham Ry., Light and Power Co., 39 So 716, 717 144 
Ala. 383. 
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A judicial error may not be corrected by trial court 
under the guise of rectifying a "clerical error." 
Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Califor-
nia, 96 P2d 796-799, 14 Cal. 2dM4. 
A clerical error, as its designation imports, is an 
error of a clerk or a subordinate officer in tran-
scribing or entering an official proceeding ordered by 
another. Marsh v. Nichols Shepard and Co., 9 S Ct. 
168, 171, 128 US 605 2d L Ed 538. 
Errors into which the court itself falls are "judi-
cial errors." An error of this character occurs when 
the judgment rendered is erroneous in some particular, 
requiring it to be changed. It is not a mere "clerical 
error" but one affecting the substance and justice of 
the judgment. Connecticut Mortgage and Title Guarantee 
Co. v. De Francesco, 151a 491, 492, 112 Conn 673. 
"Clerical mistake" includes only errors or mistakes 
arising from accidental slip or omission, and not 
errors or mistakes in the substance of what is decided 
by judgment or order. Town of Hialeah Gardens v. 
Hendry, Fla. 376 So 2d 1162 1164. 
"Clerical errors" which Trial Court may correct more 
than 30 days after judgment do not include judicial 
errors, rule permitting correction of clerical errors 
may not be used to enter judgment different from judg-
ment actually made, even if judgment made was not judg-
ment intended. Hassler v. State Mo. App. 789 SW 2d 1 
32, 1 33. 
Error in judgment or order may be corrected as 
"clerical mistake" only where error does not involve 
any judgment or discretion of the court. Matter of 
American Precision Vibrator Co. C.9-5 (Tex) 863 F2d 
428-430. 
A "clerical error" for which relief will be granted 
from a judgment is an error made by clerk in tran-
scribing or otherwise. West Virginia Oil and Gas Co. 
v. Breece Lumber Co., CA La 213 F 2d 702, 705. 
Where plaintiff seeking to foreclose mortgage stipu-
lated that only those properties listed in exhibit were 
being foreclosed, mistake in description as to one 
parcel was not a "clerical mistake" which would permit 
trial court to amend judgment. Foster v. Knutson, 516 
P2d 786, 787, 10 Wash App 175. 
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"Clerical mistakes" correctable under rule refer to 
type of error identified with mistakes in transmission, 
alteration or omission of a mechanical nature. . . . 
If pronouncement reflects a deliberate choice on the 
part of the court, the act is judicial, and errors of 
this nature are to be cured by appeal. Spomer v. 
Spomer, Wyo 580 P2d 1146-1149. 
(3) Demolition of the subject property would be needless, 
wasteful and against public interest and humanitarian 
concerns. 
There is a critical shortage of affordable housing here-
about, resulting in homelessness for hundreds of low-income 
persons. If not destroyed, this building can, should and will be 
immediately rehabilitated to replenish the community's dwindling 
low-rent housing supply. 
Appellants are eager and able to restore and reoccupy their 
properties. They submit as an exhibit to this brief (Addendum 8) 
an offer from Family House, Inc., to lease a building at 535-537 
Arctic Court, Salt Lake City, Utah, which will be extended to an 
offer to lease the property in question, 534 North 300 West, 
together with the following properties (all in Salt Lake City, 
Utah): 542 North 300 West, 515 Arctic Court, 242-244 West 500 
North, and 554-556 North 300 West. All of these properties have 
been referred to over the years in sequence by Appellants as 
Bob's Motel Annex, in the order of their acquisition. Such 
restorations would provide at least 60 desperately needed low-
rent housing units. 
These leases are contingent upon vacation of this confusing 
and ambiguous demolition order. If appeal results in removing 
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this jeopardy, the would-be lessors, Family House, Inc., will 
effectuate a program where they employ licensed contractors to 
take out permits and to direct, train, and supervise the talents 
and labor of unemployed and homeless persons. These persons then 
participate in the restoration and maintenance of the units they 
will occupy at low rent thereafter. 
This program provides employment, on-the-job training, and 
incentives as well as desperately needed housing. The organiza-
tion is presently rehabilitating a 14-unit property known as 338 
North 300 West in Salt Lake City, Utah, two blocks from Appel-
lants' property. It is a humanitarian, nonprofit and proven pro-
gram which deserves the support and encouragement of all volun-
teer and paid social workers, community improvement agencies and 
advocates of the poor such as Plaintiffs-Respondents1 attorney, 
Bruce Plenk, and the Capitol Hill Neighborhood Council he repre-
sents. 
The rehabilitation of lives and properties and neighborhoods 
which this program provides is a far more worthy objective than 
the creation of more weed-filled vacant lots, which would be the 
tragic, irreversible and only possible result if this demolition 
order is not vacated by this court. 
CONCLUSION 
The judicial errors involved in the default judgment granted 
to the Plaintiffs-Respondents and the confusion regarding which 
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property is involved, and the ownership thereof, together with 
the failure of the plaintiff to bring an essential party under 
the jurisdiction of the court should dictate that this default 
judgment be vacated. 
Precedent, legal theory, statutes, plus beneficient public 
policy and simple justice all support Defendant and Appellants' 
plea. After filing their complaint, Plaintiffs-Respondents let 
this ill-conceived lawsuit lay dormant for 18 months until 
threatened with dismissal for failure to prosecute. If demoli-
tion were to result from this judgment, no one would benefit, not 
even the plaintiffs. The appellants would suffer grievous eco-
nomic and financial loss. The community would lose valuable 
housing and tax base, and the homeless would be deprived of a way 
out of their hopeless misery and misfortune. 
Wherefore, the appellants pray the court to set aside this 
default judgment and prevent the demolition of Appellant's 
property. 
Signature of parties: 
Defendant-Appellant 
Beth Roberts (Purdue), Appellant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE ./ 
The undersigned certifies that on the / day of January, 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by 
mailing postpaid to Bruce Plenk, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respon-
dents, 124 South 400 East, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
LIST OF ADDENDA 
Affidavit of John Purdue regarding excusable nonappearance 
at second pretrial "mediation" conference, January 3, 1991. 
Warranty deed showing ownership of property in the name of 
Beth Roberts since 1955. 
nd 4. Printout from Salt Lake County tax rolls (1991) showing 
properties at 534 North 300 West (Salt Lake City), still 
vested in Beth Roberts (Purdue). 
Notice of entry of judgment ordering demolition of property 
belonging to Beth Purdue (534 North 300 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah), also showing plaintiff's surreptitious inclu-
sion of Beth Purdue's name on the judgment though she was 
not included or summoned as defendant when complaint was 
filed. 
Plaintiff's notice of readiness for trial showing only John 
Purdue as party to the proceeding. 
Proposal for demolition of Beth Purdue's property at 534 
North 300 West, Salt Lake City, by Northern Nevada Construc-
tion Company, prepared by John Henry on order of Bruce 
Plenk. 
Residential lease offer from Family House, Inc., to lease, 
rehabilitate and occupy property at 535 North Arctic Court, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN PURDUE 
Regarding defendant's nonappearance at pretrial media-
tion hearing Janury 3f 1991 , defendant John Purdue gives the 
following explanation. 
Early in 1989, Plaintiffs-Respondents filed this suit. 
I, John Purdue, the only defendant summoned or named in the 
complaint, responded timely by filing pro se an answer to 
the complaint. 
Thereafter, the Plaintiffs-Respondents let the case lie 
dormant for 18 months. Then in September 1990, after the 
court threatened to dismiss the case for plaintiffs' failure 
to prosecute, attorney Plenk filed a Notice of Readiness for 
Trial and scheduled a pretrial conference for November 14, 
1990. On that date I appeared at the scheduled time in 
Judge Murphy's court. 
Plaintiffs' attorney, Bruce Plenk, did not arrive at 
the appointed time. The judge did not appear at any time. 
After waiting almost an hour in the empty courtroom, I con-
sulted with the court clerk as to whether or not I should 
leave. The clerk telephoned Mr. Plenk at his office. I 
waited another 30 minutes before Mr. Plenk arrived. 
Upon his arrival, Mr. Plenk went directly to the clerk. 
The two of them had a private conversation from which I was 
excluded. Then Mr. Plenk left the courtroom. I followed him 
into the corridor to learn what was to happen next and when. 
I had expected this pretrial conference would deal with 
scheduling and that my wishes would be consulted. 
It was important that I be consulted, for it was 
advisable that we be in Arizona and Nevada between the 
November pretrial and the trial date scheduled for February. 
I was not consulted in regard to any further pretrials. 
Nothing about scheduling was mentioned by Mr. Plenk but 
we became involved in a heated discussion concerning why Mr. 
Plenk was recklessly seeking to demolish sturdy, viable, 
modern low-rent housing when Mr. Plenk professes to be an 
advocate of the poor and homeless. 
During the discussion it became obvious, and Mr. Plenk 
stated to me that further negotiation or mediation efforts 
would be futile. This corresponded with what Mr. Plenk had 
stated on September 20, 1990, in his Certificate of Readi-
ness for Trial, paragraph (4): 
That reasonable discussions to effect settle-
ment have been pursued by counsel and their 
clients but no settlement has been effected.. 
Consequently, I logically, reasonably and naturally 
assumed no further conferences would occur prior to the 
trial already scheduled for February 1991. I was thus 
unaware of and was thus dissuaded from being present at the 
second pretrial hearing (January 3, 1991) held while I was 
out of state at which the plaintiff obtained by default the 
order to demolish the property belonging to my wife, Beth 
Roberts (Purdue), located at 534 North 300 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
<%~t,v£L 
John W. Purdue 
Defendant-Appellant 
- 3 -
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Recorded at Request of. B^Z^^^SSUStf. i^LL. . !?? . . . 
/ atfeZfot, Fee Paid $./.;^ 2SL ^ flAgRL^Gffl^^j^mS^gt! SAL? LAKE COOOTT^  .UTAJ 
- Dep. Boo*/,£/j/?AZt„yJ.Ja„ Ref.: 
ffail tax notice to ^. Address...... 
WARRANTY DEED 
DOROTHY. G. GARCIA, grantor 
o f
 Salt Lake City »County of Salt Lake » State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
BETH R03EP.TS, also known as BETH ALENE ROBERTS 
grantee 
of Salt Lake City County Salt Lake , State of Utah 
for the sum of TDf AND NO/lOO ($10.00) - - DOLLARS, 
and other good and valuable consideration 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
Salt Lake County, 
BEGINNING at' the Southwest corner cf Lot 5* Block 132, 
Plat "A" i Salt I*eke City Surrey, and running thence 
North 44.44 feetj thence East 165 feetj thence South 
44*44 feet; thence Vest 165 feet to the place of be-
ginning. 
Subject to any and a l l general taxes and special 
assessments levied or assessed, due or to become due 
after December 31st, 1954* 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 30th day of 
Signed in the presence of 
June A.D. 19 55 
. . ; ^ & ^ ^ 
..^X^M^.^...x(^jQ^^J^r 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
County of . Salt LakJ •a. 
On the j f e ) day of Jum 
appeared before me DOROTHI o r GARCIA 
A. D., 19 55 personally 
>>\*n 
My Commission expires...#^y^.#./ry..Z^..£..My residence IsJTl.. Jalt.Xakei.Clty^:.I 
TRIB DtSD PftlNTSD ESPBCtALLT POt PHOTO RECORDtKO, USB SLACK INK AND TTPS, 
BUak H«. I01-K.Hr C*., t t W«* I * forth. f*K Ufct City i IIM 
C 32 
/ 3 6> 
I"08-36-205-007-0000 
:ERTS, BETH 
7 
t : 
E SOUTHTEMPLE 
UT 
534 N 300 U 
ST 
DIST 01 
PRINT U UPDATE 
LEGAL 
TAX CLASS NE 
EDIT 1 BATCH NO 0 
841021641 BATCH SEQ 0 
EDIT 1 BOOK 0000 
P R O P E R T Y D E S C R I P T 
COM AT SU COR LOT 5 BLK 132 PLAT A SLC SUR 
RDS S 44.44 FT U 10 RDS TO BEG 
TOTAL ACRES 
REAL ESTATE 
BUILDINGS 
MOTOR VEHIC 
TOTAL VALUE 
PAGE 0000 DATE 
TYPE UNKN PLAT 
I O N 
N 44.44 FT E 10 
0.17 
29400 
28000 
0 
57400 
00/00/00 
DI 08-36-205-008-0000 DIST 01 TOTAL ACRES 0.27 
BERTS, BETH A. PRINT U UPDATE REAL ESTATE 20300 
LEGAL BUILDINGS 10000 
TAX CLASS NE MOTOR VEHIC 0 
77 E SOUTHTEMPLE ST EDIT 1 BATCH NO 0 TOTAL VALUE 30300 
:, UT 841021641 BATCH SEQ 0 
:: 534 N 300 W EDIT 1 BOOK 0000 PAGE OOOO DATE 00/00/00 
3: TYPE UNKN PLAT 
P R O P E R T Y D E S C R I P T I O N 
COM AT NW COR LOT 4 BLK 132 PLAT A SLC SUR S 70 FT E 10 RDS 
N 70 FT W 10 RDS TO BEG 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
By: BRUCE PLENK #2613 
124 South 400 East, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CAPITOL HILL NEIGHBORHOOD a 
COUNCIL, INC., a non-profit : 
Corporation, and KEITH s 
AND DEBBIE WIDDISON, \ 
Plaintiffs, J 
VS. 1 
JOHN AND BETH PURDUE, I 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY 
! OF JUDGMENT 
( Civil No. 890902814 
i Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
all parties are hereby notified that on the 31st day of January, 
1991, a Default Judgment against defendants was entered by the 
Court ordering the building located at 534 North 300 West, Salt 
Lake City, Utah be demolished on or before May 15, 1991. If 
defendants fail to comply with this order, plaintiffs are awarded 
judgment in the amount of $4,400 plus demolition permit fees and 
any other costs to be placed in trust with plaintiffs' attorney to 
be used solely for paying the costs of demolition. • payin 
DATED this S day of f^i/J , 1991. 
3 
UTAH LEGAL/SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys yEtfr P l a i n t i f f s 
: BRUCE PLENK 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BY: BRUCE PLENK, #2613 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAPITOL HILL NEIGHBORHOOD * 
COUNCIL, INC., a non-profit * 
Corporation, and KEITH * CERTIFICATE OF 
AND DEBBIE WIDDISON, * READINESS FOR TRIAL 
Plaintiffs, * 
vs. * 
* Civil No. 890902814 
JOHN PURDUE, * 
* Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. * 
TO THE DISTRICT COURT: 
Utah Legal Services, Inc., by Bruce Plenk, attorney for 
Plaintiffs, by his signature below here certifies that in his 
judgment this case is ready for trial and in support of such 
certification counsel represents to the Court as follows: 
1. That all required pleadings have been filed and the case 
is at issue as to all parties. 
2. That counsel has completed all discovery; and that all 
discovery of record has been completed. 
3. That there are no motions that have been filed which 
remain pending and upon which no disposition has been made. 
4. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have 
been pursued by counsel and their clients but no settlement has 
been effected. 
5. Non-jury trial is demanded. 
Counsel further certifies that the following were mailed 
correct copies of this certificate: 
DATED this 
John Purdue 
1177 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
H p^ day of SgyCtrivJIr^ 
UTAH LEGAL 
Attorneys f 
LP 
, 1990, 
RVICES, INC. 
Plaintiffs 
B*: BRUCE PLENK 
[a:capitol.cer NAP] 
2 
Expert Demolition & Excavation 
350 W. Hartwell • Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 • (801) 485-6655 
Proposal 
R E E T T ^ ' * V J I JOB NAME rs 
nr, STATE XND ZIP coot TE AND ZIP CODE , 
Bt-^ c- p&tto 
JOB LOCATION 
f?*f N) ><?OCJ S ^ C ~ 
B hereby propose to fumtsh material* and labor necessary for the completion of 
p3*rtflM f YUSHQVL, 4?c/tld(A< - fi(( fe CMSAI* 
3 H ^ J C 
• Sewers will be capped at edge of building. 
• Buried debris that is not structurally related to building(s) mentioned herein will be removed at additional cost 
• Extra work will be performed when a price has been agreed upon by both the owner & ourselves. 
Wl^ROPOSE hereby to furnish material and labor — complete in accordance with above specifications, for the sum of: 
de within 30 days of completion of work. / / 
Ail material is guaranteed to be as specified. All work to be completed in a substantial workmanlike 
manner according to specifications submitted, per standard practices Any alteration or deviation 
from above specifications involving extra costs will be executed only upon written orders, and will 
become an extra charge over and above the estimate All agreements contingent upon strikes, 
accidents or delays beyond our control. Owners to carry fire, tornado and other necessary 
insurance Our workers are fully covered by Workmen's Compensation Insurance 
ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL The above prices, specifications and conditions are 
satisfactory and are hereby accepted. You are authorized to do the work as specified. Payment will 
be made as outlined above 
P.O. Box 17193 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Residential — Commercial 
Total Property Management 
RESIDENTIAL LEASE 
Apartment - Condominium - House 
BY THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into on £ C> »^^ , 19 9 / 
between , herein referred to as Lessor, 
and y**ytPY) i / </ M>tMut J&JC- ^
 t , herein referred to as Lessee, 
Lessor leases to Lessee the m»mkp<: situate/I at £> 3*J AJ, /h2 7"7 C 
larly desenbed as 
/Ab 
, together with all appurtenances, for a term of & AJ C~ years, to commence on 
, 19 °TZ^. and to end on 3/ j-ft+S , 19 9 3 > 
1. Rent. Lessee agrees to pay, without demand, to Lessor as rent for the demised premises the sum of 
PMA> O^iW
 T Dollars 
(S /M ) per monthQn advance on the" / ^-" day of each calendar month beginning 
check or cash. Personal checks are not acceptable. ^n°r#.T\k)<^ ^s £>O<*AJ A$> /
 te& , 1 9 ^ 2 ^ Payments are to De maae Dy money order, certified 
n
2. Security Deposit. On execution of this lease, Lessee deposits with Lessor 
^ Dollars 
(S /04 ^ )» receipt of which is acknowledged by .Lessor, as security for the faithful 
performance by Lessee of the terms hereof, to be returned to Lessee, without interest, on the full and faithful 
performance by him of the provisions hereof. 
3. Quiet Enjoyment. Lessor covenants that on paying the rent and performing the covenants 
herein contained. Lessee shall peacefully and quietly have, hold, and enjoy the demised premises for the agreed 
term. 
4. Use of Premises. The demised premises shall be used and occupied by Lessee exclusively as 
a private single family residence, and neither the premises nor any pan thereof shall be used at any time during 
the term of this lease by Lessee for the purpose of carrying on any business, profession, or trade of any kind, 
or for any purpose other than as a private single family residence. Lessee shall comply with all the sanitary 
laws, ordinances, rules, and orders of appiopnate governmental authorities affecting the cleanliness, 
occupancy, and preservation of the demised premises, and the sidewalks connected thereto, during the term of 
this lease. 
5. NumberxfcfjQccupants. Lessee agrees that the demised premises shall be occupied by no 
more than A// //persons, consisting of adults wd/CJ/fi children under the age of 
years, without the written consent of Lessor. 
6. Condition of Premises. Lessee stipulates that he has examined the demised premises, 
including the grounds and all buildings and improvements, and that they are. a c c e p t e d "as i s " u n l e s s 
e x c e p t i o n s are noted on page 3 o f t h i s c o n t r a c t . 
7. Assignment and Subletting. Without the prior written consent of Lessor, Lessee shall 
not assign this lease, or sublet or grant any concession or licence to use the premises or any part thereof. A 
consent by Lessor to one assignment, subletting, concession, or license shall not be deemed to be a consent 
to any subsequent assignment, subletdng, concession, or license. An assignment, subletting, concession, or 
license without the prior written consent of Lessor, or an assignment or subletting by operation of law, shall 
be void and shall, at Lessor's option, terminate this lease. 
8. Alterations and Improvements. Lessee shall make no alterations to the buildings on the 
demised premises or construct any building or make other improvements on the demised premises without the 
prior written consent of Lessor. All alterations, changes, and improvements built, construct^
 Cr ^ zctd on 
the demised premises b/ Lc^cc, with die exception of fixtures removable without damage to the premises and 
movable personal property, shall, unless otherwise provided by written agreement between Lessor and Lessee, 
be the property of Lessor and remain on the demised premises at the expiration or sooner termination of this 
lease. 
9. Damage to Premises. If the demised premises, or any part thereof, shall be partially 
damaged by fire or other casualty not due to Lessee's negligence or willful act or that of his employee, family, 
agent, or visitor, the premises shall be promptly repaired by Lessor and there shall be an abatement of rent 
corresponding with the ume during which, and the extent to which, the leased premises may have been 
untenantable; but, if the leased premises should be damaged other than by Lessee's negligence or willful act 
or that of his employee, family, agent, or visitor to the extent that Lessor shall decide not to rebuild or repair, 
the term of this lease shall end and the rent shall be prorated up to the time of the damage. 
^ ^ 1 ^ f»/of \L A-f-fiw*-4-
thing of a dangerous, mtiammaoie, or CXPIUMYG cumacua mat imguw uiuvo^uaui; *».,**.-«-%, —>, >—.0^ . „. 
on the leased premises or that might be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance 
company. 
11. Utilities. Lessee shall be responsible for arranging for and paying for all utility services 
required on the premises, except that Kl<Xj%^ s n a^ 
be provided by Lessor. 
12. Maintenance and Repair, Lessee will, at his sole expense, keep and maintain the leased 
premises and appurtenances in good and sanitary condition and repair during the term of this lease and any 
renewal thereof. In particular, Lessee shall keep the fixtures in the house or on or about the leased premises 
in good order and repair, keep the furnace clean; keep the electric bells in order; keep the walks irtt from dirt 
and debris; and, at his sole expense, shall make all required repairs to the plumbing, range, heating, apparatus, 
and electric and gas fixtures whenever damage thereto shall have resulted from Lessee's misuse, waste, or 
neglect or that of his employee, family, agent, or visitor. Major maintenance and repair of the leased 
premises, not due to Lessee's misuse, waste, or neglect or that of his employee, family, agent, or visitor, 
shall be the responsibility of Lessor or his assigns. - Lsw&t**^ TZ> p #&«> ce *<-<- wtf&i*-> / U -
Lessee agrees that no signs shall be placed or painting done on or about the leased premises by 
Lessee or at his direction without the prior written consent of Lessor. 
13. Animals. Lessee shall keep no domestic or other animals on or about the leased premises 
without the written consent of Lessor. 
14. Right of Inspection. Lessor and his agents shall have the right at all reasonable times 
during the term of this lease and any renewal thereof to enter the demised premises for the purpose of 
inspecting the premises and all building and improvements thereon. 
15. Display of Signs. During the last 30 days 0f ^'IS |easCf Lessor or his agent shall 
have the privilege of displaying the usual "For Sale" or "For Rent" or "Vacancy" signs on the demised 
premises and of showing the property to prospective purchasers or tenants. 
16. Subordination of Lease. This lease and Lessee's leasehold interest hereunder are and shall 
be subject, subordinate, and inferior to any liens or encumbrances now or hereafter placed on the demised 
premises by Lessor, all advances made under any such liens or encumbrances, the interest payable on any such 
liens or encumbrances, and any and all renewals or extensions of such liens or encumbrances. 
17. Holdover by Lessee. Should Lessee remain in possession of the demised premises with the 
consent of Lessor after the natural expiration of this lease, a new month-to-month tenancy shall be created 
between Lessor and Lessee which shall be subject to all the terms and conditions hereof but shall be 
terminated on days' written notice served by either Lessor or Lessee on the other party. 
18. Surrender of Premises. At the expiration of the lease term, Lessee shall quit and surrender 
the premises hereby demised in as good state and condition as they were at the commencement of this lease, 
reasonable use and wear thereof and damages by the elements excepted. 
19. Default. If any default is made in the payment of rent, or any part thereof, at the times 
hereinbefore specified, or if any default is made in the performance of or compliance with any other term or 
condition hereof, the lease, at the option of Lessor, shall terminate and be forfeited, and Lessor may re-enter 
the premises and remove all persons therefrom. Lessee shall be given written notice of any default or breach, 
and termination and forfeiture of the lease shall not result if, within 5 days of receipt of such notice, 
Lessee has corrected the default or breach or has taken action reasonably likely to effect such correction within 
a reasonable time. 
20. Abandonment. If at any time during the term of this lease Lessee abandons the demised 
premises or any part thereof, Lessor may, at his option, enter the demised premises by any means without 
being liable for any prosecution therefor, and without becoming liable to Lessee for damages or for any 
payment of any kind whatever, and may, at his discretion, as agent for Lessee, relet the demised premises, or 
any part thereof, for the whole or any part of the then unexpired term, and may receive and collect all rent 
payable by virtue of such reletting, and, at Lessor's option, hold Lessee liable for any difference between the 
rent that would have been pyable under this lease during the balance of the unexpired term, if this lease had 
continued in force, and the net rent for such period realized by Lessor by means of such reletting. If Lessor's 
right of re-entry is exercised following abandonment of the premises by Lessee, then Lessor may consider any 
personal property belonging to Lessee and left on the premises to also have been abandoned, in which case 
Lessor may dispose of all such personal property in any manner Lessor shall deem proper and is hereby 
relieved of all liability for doing so. 
21. Binding Effect. The covenants and conditions herein contained shall apply to and bind the 
heirs, legal representatives, and assigns of the parties hereto, and all covenants are to be construed as 
conditions of this lea^e. 
22. Other Terms: 
Other terms noted on page 3 of this contract. ^ ^ .„ ,. jfe „ y - W /f 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this lease at 
, the day and year first above written. 
Lessor Lessee 
